Research paper

The Philippines' antidrug campaign: Spatial and temporal patterns of killings linked to drugs

Jenna Mae L. Atun[a], Ronald U. Mendoza[a], Clarissa C. David[a,b,*], Radxeanel Peviluar N. Cossid[a], Cheryll Ruth R. Soriano[c]

[a] *Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines*
[b] *Graduate Studies Department, College of Mass Communication, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines*
[c] *Department of Communication, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines*

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Background: As soon as President Rodrigo Duterte assumed office in 2016, the Philippine government launched a nationwide antidrug campaign based on enforcement-led anti-illegal drugs policies primarily implemented by the national police. This was followed by a spate of killings resulting from both acknowledged police operations and by unidentified assailants. This study assembles a victim-level dataset of drug-related killings covered by the media during the Philippine government's antidrug campaign, and presents a spatial and temporal analysis of the killings.

Methods: The dataset covers information on 5021 people killed from May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017. Data collected systematically through online search procedures and existing listings of media organizations detailing information about incidences of drug-related police operations and drug-related killings in 'vigilante-style' manner reveal patterns for who were being killed, where, and how.

Results: Over half of the killings were due to acknowledged police operations, and the rest were targeted in so-called 'vigilante-style' killings. The first three months after Mr. Duterte was sworn in were the deadliest months. Those who were killed were mostly low-level drug suspects.

   The analysis of temporal pattern reveals the scale of killings in the country, with rapid escalation starting in July 2016 and lasting throughout the rest of that year. Observable declines occurred during periods when the 'drug war' was suspended and operations were moved to a non-police enforcement unit and rose again when police were brought back into operations. The spatial analysis indicates a large concentration of deaths in the National Capital Region (40%) compared to the rest of the country with wide variations across cities and regions.

Conclusions: Overall, the Philippine 'drug war' exhibits similarities with violent wars on drugs waged in other countries such as Thailand, with heavily police-led interventions leading to fatalities in the thousands over a span of under two years. Findings of this study point to important policy adjustments that need to be made, including the role that local governments play in drug policy implementation, the disproportionate negative impacts of enforcement-led policies against drugs on urban and poor areas, the targeting of low-level suspected drug dealers and users, and the importance of proper data monitoring and transparency by the government to inform policy adjustments in the face of high costs to human life. We also discuss the importance of independent monitoring systems when the government reports conflicting information.

Introduction

In May 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, former mayor of Davao City, was elected president of the Philippines. During the campaign, Mr. Duterte pushed for a war against illegal drugs, which he argued was the most dangerous threat to the country (The Guardian, 2016). Through a singular platform of peace and order, he promised a swift end to drugs, crime, and corruption in the Philippines (Izadi, 2016).

As soon as Mr. Duterte assumed office, the Philippine National Police (PNP) was tasked to operationalize and mobilize a nationwide antidrug campaign called "Project Double Barrel" (Coronel, 2017). The policy and operationalization ran on two levels—Project *Tokhang* and Project HVT (high-value targets)—with the former focusing on 'drug-affected' barangays and communities and the latter on big-time

syndicates (Gavilan, 2017). The term *Tokhang* is derived from two Visayan words *toktok* and *hangyo*, meaning "to knock and plead" whereby police officers and local officials conduct house-to-house visits to persuade alleged 'drug personalities' to stop their illegal activities, surrender to authorities, and join drug rehabilitation programs. Aside from house visits, the campaign involved various forms of police activity, including gathering intelligence for identifying drug users in communities (compiled in so-called 'drug watch lists'), imposing random drug tests, and other police operations (e.g., entrapments, community sweeps, and armed raids) (Gonzales & Cabigao, 2016). The launch of the so-called 'war on drugs' was immediately followed by a rising death toll resulting from acknowledged police operations, coupled with a surge of violent killings of suspected drug personalities by unidentified assailants in what have been called 'vigilante-style killings' (Palatino, 2017). Mr. Duterte won the election held on May 9, 2016, and was proclaimed president on June 30. The very next day, July 1, 2016, there were 39 reported deaths associated with the 'drug war'.

This paper focuses on the killings in the Philippines associated with the government's campaign against illegal drugs using data collected from media reports, sources that provide publicly available information on victims' identities, manner of killing, and link to drug use or sale. Police have been largely opaque about the antidrug operations, the deaths resulting from them, and the other aspects of the anti-illegal drugs policy such as *Tokhang*, which led to media organizations providing a running tally of deaths. Different aspects of the campaign have been criticized as being violative of basic human rights and due process of law (Habaradas, Santiago, Reyes, & Agunoy, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2017), but the government has been resisting sharing information back to the public. A recent United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution called for a probe of the human rights situation in the Philippines, which the government strongly rejected (Parrocha, 2019). There is limited independent monitoring and study of the nature of these drug-related killings and the extent to which the police-led campaign has succeeded in reducing drug use in the country, if at all.

Drug use and drug policy in the Philippines

While official data on the number of drug users in the country are available, the Office of the President has often deviated from the official numbers. An official survey by the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) conducted in 2015–2016 estimated that there were around 1.8 million 'current drug users' in the Philippines, with the question posed in the survey asking if the person has used drugs in the past year (Dangerous Drugs Board, 2016). This translates to 2.3% of the population aged 10–69 years old which, at that time, was projected at 102.96 million. The most commonly used drug is marijuana with 72% of users or 1.27 million using it the past year. Less than half (48.9%) or 859,150 use crystal methamphetamine or *shabu*. Thus, setting aside marijuana use, the prevalence of use of hard drugs (with 'use' defined conservatively) is only a little more than 1%.

The survey's estimate of drug users is much lower than the ones often reported by Mr. Duterte in public speeches, with various numbers ranging from 3 million to 8 million drug users (specifically, he uses the label 'drug addicts'; Esguerra, 2019a; Ranada, 2017). The President has often used these inflated numbers to argue for more aggressive police-led campaigns to eliminate drugs and drug users, while top antidrug officials have disputed these 'exaggerated' numbers (Baldwin & Marshall, 2016) and at least one official being fired from his position as a result (Interaksyon, 2017).

Drug use in the Philippines is highly criminalized (Lasco, 2018) and has been, for a long time, the subject of punitive and prohibitionist government enforcement policies (Csete et al., 2016). Research on drug users in the Philippines, specifically of *shabu,* suggests that they skew largely male, urban, and poor. In a series of papers derived from ethnographic research, Lasco (2014, 2018) finds that use is evident in

workers in the informal economy. It gives workers stamina, keeps them awake, staves off hunger, and allows them a measure of disinhibition needed so they can survive in occupations such as sex work and theft. Drug use is associated with poverty, where young men with few employment options resort to jobs that require high levels of risk and physically demanding labor, which in turn fuels the need for substances that would enhance their abilities to engage in work for long hours. In other words, drug use is likely a result of poverty, rather than poverty a result of drug use. Within this context, the heavy police enforcement through the *Oplan Double Barrel* policy resulted in high levels of vulnerability for violent effects of the operations among poor and urban communities.

Drug policies that involve heavy policing have been shown to result in the disproportionate targeting of those who are small-scale users and not those who engage trafficking large quantities of illegal substances (e.g., Caulkins & Reuter, 2017; Hughes, Barratt, Ferris, Mier, & Winstock, 2018; McDonald & Hughes, 2017). Police responses to illegal drugs to enforce criminal laws for drug-related violations such as use, production, or possession are prioritized in terms of attention and resource allocation over preventive or treatment-based interventions (Drucker, 2002; Elovich & Drucker, 2008). Raising the physical risk of drug use and sale by making them vulnerable to police action drives the drug trade underground and raises the likelihood of drug market violence (Werb et al., 2011), especially in urban communities (Agren, 2010; Martin et al., 2009). Werb et al. (2011) conclude through a review of published empirical studies that "contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing drug law enforcement will reduce violence, the existing scientific evidence base suggests that drug prohibition likely contributes to drug market violence and increased homicide rates" (p. 91).

The Philippines' recent enforcement push has attracted both local and international attention amid allegations of widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings (EJKs) and summary executions by law enforcement officials (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The campaign has also resulted in mass arrests in which people are put in jails where living conditions are themselves violative of basic human rights (see Narag, 2018). Since the 'drug war' began, international bodies have made definitive moves to apply some scrutiny to the policies and practices, including the UNHRC resolution of late, and International Criminal Court's (ICC) preliminary examination to determine if a full investigation should be launched (International Criminal Court, 2018). The Philippine's antidrug campaign is part of a global trend in 'Wars on Drugs' that played out in countries such as Thailand (Williams & Palmer, 2016). These 'wars' involve heightened criminal sanctions and, in the case of the Philippines, political rhetoric that demonizes drug users as not deserving of human dignity and only bringing violence to communities (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Ramos, 2016).

The rise of illegal drugs in national policy agenda

In the two decades leading up to the current Presidential administration, 'fighting criminality' had never figured into the opinion polls as being one of the most important or urgent national problems that needed to be addressed; these were always identified as inflation, wages, poverty, and jobs (Pulse Asia Research, Inc., 2016). Since assuming office in 2016, the President has very publicly characterized the country as a 'narco-state' ruled by 'narco-politicians' and 'narco-police' who, he claimed, are going to destroy the country and need to be destroyed themselves (Gita, 2017). Despite repeated denials that the police are deliberately killing alleged drug offenders, Mr. Duterte has in many public occasions encouraged the police, and even the general public, to use deadly force in pursuing drug suspects (Cupin, 2016; Lema, 2017).

The policy rhetoric surrounding the Philippine government's anti-drug campaign is reflected in the President's various public statements.

These statements, characterized by scholars as inflammatory and threatening, sow fear among suspected drug offenders, especially when taken together with the uptick in drug-related killings (Habaradas et al., 2019). In talking about the 'drug war' publicly, Mr. Duterte has used stories that place him in the role of a savior who struggles against dark forces (i.e., illegal drugs and drug offenders; Barrera, 2017). Identifying the 'folk devil' or a group that can be attacked is essential in creating a 'moral panic' in the context of punitive drug policies (Hawdon, 2001).

Policing in urban Philippines

The police figure prominently in the Philippine 'drug war' narrative. Historical accounts have established how presidents and local political elites have used the police as instrument of violence and coercion (see McCoy, 2002; Kreuzer, 2009). A mapping of police violence in some regions from 2006 to 2015 (Kreuzer, 2018) shows that fatal police encounters have characterized Philippine policing even before the antidrug campaign started. Although levels vary by region, province, and city, the analysis suggests that when PNP officers engaged in armed encounters, they almost always shot to kill the suspects and not to incapacitate them. An investigative report published in *Reuters* in 2016 found that in 51 drug-related police shootings in Metro Manila that the journalists have reviewed, the police killed 100 suspects and wounded only three (Baldwin, Marshall, & Sagolj, 2016).

Ethnographic studies (Jensen & Hapal, 2018; Lasco, 2018; Warburg & Jensen, 2018) in urban poor communities in Metro Manila reveal how poor residents form, navigate, and negotiate relations with a police force that is "accustomed to extortion and execution" (Coronel, 2017, p. 189). Jensen and Hapal (2018) invoke the concept of 'violent exchange' to explain how the violence and the threat of it form relations and exchanges between the police and residents in which "human life is price-tagged" (p. 42). In this context, the massive simultaneous and accelerated deployment of the police in national drug operations (as opposed to the status quo which placed this responsibility to the much smaller Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency), alongside cash reward incentives to police offers for 'neutralizing' drug offenders (Coronel, 2017), ordered by the President in his first day in office opens up urban poor communities to further disproportionate vulnerabilities.

The media play an important role in shaping narratives surrounding crime, violence, and policing. News coverage of the killings in the Philippine antidrug campaign shows that police narratives are given prime importance over the counter-narratives of family members, resulting in one-sided stories that place a positive value on killings of suspected drug offenders (Soriano, David, & Atun, 2019). Media representations of policing have been shown to affect real-life policing as these depictions influence police officers' identity work, with more favorable representations having self-enhancing effects and unfavorable representations spurring strategies of distancing and reframing (Rantatalo, 2016). Innes (2014) points out how police activity is often "explicitly choreographed for the mass media" (p. 137). This is shown in how police officers, in the context of drugs policing, engage in 'symbolic policing' in which crackdowns are "more tied up with threats, assurance, and the cleansing of drug market spaces, than with providing a considered policing strategy that is problem-solving" (Coomber, Moyle, & Mahoney, 2019, p. 13).

Monitoring drug-related killings in the Philippines

The number of 'casualties' associated with the implementation of the Philippine government's antidrug policy have varied, with estimates ranging from a low of 4000 to a high of 20,000 people killed in the first 18 months of the administration (Sridharan, 2018). In February 2019, the police officially stated that 5176 people have been killed in their antidrug operations from the day that the campaign was launched on July 1, 2016 to January 31, 2019 (Esguerra, 2019b). In addition, there were 22,983 possibly drug-related 'deaths under investigation'[1] from July 2016 until May 2018 (Felipe, 2018), a portion of which is attributable to the "vigilante-style killings" targeting suspected drug dealers.

The wide ranges in estimates of the death toll in the antidrug campaign are largely the result of an opaque system of collecting government data and statistics.[2] This is exacerbated by the government backtracking on some of its own statistics on drug-related deaths multiple times, often reclassifying counts into different categories (Talabong, 2018). The lack of reliable information raises important issues of accountability, especially for the killings, few of which have been independently investigated (see Buan, Talabong, & Gavilan, 2019). Moreover, if the veracity of government data is an issue, then it would be difficult to assess fully how effective the enforcement-heavy antidrug policy has been. Policymakers at the national level, therefore, would require granular information that may provide insights into how the antidrug policy is being implemented by local government officials, the police, and other drug enforcement agencies.

The use of media reports to build datasets of killings or incidents of police violence is not new, especially in situations in which crime and violence are heavily covered by the media. In mapping police violence in the Philippines before the Duterte administration, Kreuzer (2018) built a dataset using data drawn from 27 national broadsheets and 38 regional and local news outlets. The dataset contained information on police violence in the context of 'legitimate' armed encounters between the police and alleged criminals in 26 provinces and 17 component units of the National Capital Region from 2006 to 2015. The *Washington Post* has been tracking every fatal police shooting in the United States since 2015 and its database relies mostly on news reports, law enforcement websites, and social media as well as other independent databases (Tate et al., 2016). *Fatal Encounters,* an independent database that has been tracking fatal police encounters in the U.S. since 2000, also uses media reports among other sources, to gather data (Fatal Encounters, 2019).

In this paper, we introduce the dataset and describe the procedures for building it alongside a presentation of statistical analyses examining the geospatial and temporal spread of the deaths. We also empirically examine differences across types of killings. The analyses have the following research objectives: (1) to describe the spatial spread of the killings across provinces of the country and within the cities of the National Capital Region, (2) to examine patterns of types of incidents that are linked to the deaths, namely police operations as opposed to deaths resulting from attacks by unidentified assailants, and (3) to document the temporal spread of killings and situate them in the historical developments related to the antidrug operations' shifts. Results then guide policy recommendations.

---

[1] 'Deaths under investigation' or DUI is a term used by the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the early months of the antidrug campaign to refer to killings outside of the antidrug operations. It was later renamed to 'homicide cases under investigation' or HCUI.

[2] In April 2018, the Supreme Court of the Philippines compelled the Philippine government to provide full documentation of the killings resulting from police operations and those classified as 'deaths under investigation' from July 1, 2016 to November 30, 2017 (Buan, 2018). The order arose after hearing two separate petitions that sought to declare the antidrug campaign unconstitutional. In May 2018, the PNP has started submitting documentations to the Supreme Court (Punay, 2018). In September 2018, however, the Solicitor General has filed a motion seeking to stop the release of thousands of documents related to the killings citing 'law enforcement and national security implications' (Buan, 2019a). On April 2, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the Solicitor General's motion and ordered the release of documents on 20,322 killings to the petitioners (Buan, 2019b).

Method

All information on drug-related killings included here are from publicly available broadcast, print, or online news publications of reputable media agencies in the Philippines. The original data sources, comprised of web pages of news stories and videos of television broadcasts, were archived and catalogued in a manner consistent with the victim case identification (ID) number in the dataset. The initial lists of media stories and identifiable individual victims were sourced from the two largest lists compiled by *ABS-CBN* and the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*[3] . Both lists are built from automated alert system set up by monitoring teams at each media organization and from internal news reports filed by their staff[4] .

Inclusion criteria

Deaths related to the government's antidrug campaign include people who allegedly had ties to drugs. We sought to collect information on these deaths that took place from May 10, 2016, the day after the presidential election, to September 29, 2017, when the research project stopped adding new cases to the dataset. Victims who were injured in drug-related incidents and survived are not included in the analysis. A death is included in the dataset if the following criteria are evident: (1) a person was killed by violent means such as gunshot, stabbing, or beating, and (2) the report or source mentions that the person killed is alleged to have had a history of drug use, had links to drugs as a pusher or dealer, was on the drug watch list, had a drug-related case filed against them, or that the death is linked to, or is a result of, the government's antidrug campaign.

Sources of cases

All information on victims in this dataset comes from sources that are verified by media through their reporting and editorial fact-checking. This means every case in the dataset represents an individual victim and the total number represents a conservative minimum of documented drug-related deaths since the administration started. Incidents that were not covered by media (e.g., those that were not reported by families, cases where the incidents are geographically far from the reach of national media) are not included in this dataset.

Coding procedure

Four coders received training on how to systematically create the dataset using the code sheet and data entry procedures. Additions and revisions to the code sheet are documented and circulated to the rest of the team for adoption. Each coder reads, views, or listens to the news story or narrative and enters information indicated in the code sheet when available in the story. Cells are left blank when no information is available. Almost all variables are specified as binary (e.g., 1 or 0). Not all variables specified in the code sheet have available values.

---

[3] Since an accurate count of the deaths has been elusive, several media organizations have begun compiling their own list a few months after the antidrug campaign started. They have also initiated in-depth examinations of reported government statistics and collated both media reports of violent deaths and reports from civil society groups. National news organizations such as the *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (Inquirer.net, 2016) and *ABS-CBN* (ABS-CBN Investigative & Research Group, 2016) began publishing updated lists of deaths since July 2016. The *Inquirer* called its own page *The Kill List*. Both *Rappler* (Bueza, 2017) and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (2017) published stories that documented how the government changed its own official death counts.

[4] This research does not require an ethics statement or formal ethics review because it does not deal with human subjects, only media content.

Variables in the dataset

There are broad categories of information coded into the dataset and each set is explained below.

a **Victim information**. Standard information on the victims is coded for in the data sheet. It includes full names when available, aliases, age, gender, and occupation. Victims can be 'unidentified,' as they often are in cases where bodies are found away from the site of the killing and outside their community of residence. Unidentified victims are labeled as 'unidentified,' and cross-checking is done to minimize the risk of a single unidentified victim appearing more than once in the dataset. This is done by triangulating various data sources to ensure that the victims are unique and distinct and that there is no double-counting in the dataset.

b **Incident information**. Details on the circumstances of the killing are coded for, with a different set of variables for those killed as a result of a police operation, those killed by unidentified assailants, and those whose remains were found or discovered. The last of these, sometimes referred to here as 'body dumps'— a term coined by the media for dead bodies discovered, usually on the street—include the initial rash of killings in 2016 when men were found dead on streets, their heads covered with packaging tape, and their hands and feet bound. Basic information for each incident includes date and time, location, site of killing, and context (e.g., outside business establishment, inside or in front of home).

More than half of the killings documented here are killings that happened in the context of an acknowledged police operation, and details of the police operations are recorded only as they were reported by the police and the media stories. These include the type of police operation (e.g., buy-bust operation, serving a warrant, or raid), whether a police officer was interviewed for the news story, and whether drugs or guns were found with the victim.

Results

Total deaths and dates of deaths

The dataset covers 5021 individual victims[5] . These deaths were reported in news stories that quoted police officers, including police chiefs, who recounted the circumstances of the killings. Over half of the deaths, or 55%, are linked to acknowledged police operations. The remaining 45% of deaths were killings not due to acknowledged police operations: 38% were killed by assailants; and another 7% were so-called 'body dumps,' victims whose dead bodies were discovered in a location and may have been killed elsewhere.

In media reports, each victim's alleged drug connection is described in various ways, such as: person killed was listed in the local drug watch list (23%), victim was an alleged drug user or dealer, person previously surrendered in *Oplan Tokhang* (11%), or a friend, family, or community member of the victim said the person used drugs. The labels used by the media or the police include: drug pusher or dealer (47%), drug user or addict (8%), drug courier or runner (1.1%), narco-politician (1.3%), narco-police (1.2%), or drug lord (0.6%).

Fig. 1 shows the number of people killed each day between May 10, 2016 and September 29, 2017. During this 16-month period, there was a clear pattern of surges in killings and periods of low death counts. The first high death count period was June 19 and 20, 2016, when the tally went from single-digits per night to 16 and 11 deaths on each of those days. The high rate of deaths continued throughout the months of July until September of 2016. There were some reduction in nightly killings

---

[5] Of this total, 80% are identified by their real names, while another 9% are known only by their aliases; the rest are unidentified (11%).

Fig. 1. Number of Drug-Related Deaths by Day, from May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017.
Note: One case is excluded from this timeline because the exact date of incident could not be identified.

Fig. 2. Number of Drug-Related Deaths by Month, by Type of Incident.
Note: Numbers for May 2016 cover only May 10–31 and for September 2017, only up to the 29th of that month. One killing had no date so is not included on this chart. There was not enough available information on six cases, so these could not be categorized by type.

after this initial period even though there were still days when more than 10 deaths were reported.

Death counts per night in Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) are separated out in orange in Fig. 1. The pattern suggests that a disproportionate number of deaths per day occurred in Metro Manila compared to the rest of the country. In the early months of the campaign, there were more killings in other parts of the country. By around November 2016, however, the rate of killings appeared to have abated in the rest of the Philippines but remained high in Metro Manila. Further examination of the data in the provinces reveals that areas directly neighboring NCR also registered high death rates, namely Bulacan in the north of Metro Manila.

The first sustained decline in rate of killings per day began in late January 2017, when *Oplan Tokhang* was suspended temporarily as a reaction to revelations that the kidnapping and murder of a Korean businessman in October 2016 was perpetrated by police officers inside police premises (Nicolas, 2017). This suspension was declared on January 30 through a memorandum issued by then PNP Director General Ronald de la Rosa (Sunstar, 2017). The sharp reduction in deaths, below 10 per night on most nights, started on January 27. On March 6, operations were relaunched under a new operational name, *Oplan*

Double Barrel Reloaded. Ten people were reported killed on the same day. These recalibrations in government policy are revealing because high death rates follow periods of intense government-led operations.

A second major surge of killings happened in August 2017. On the first three days of that month, 44 people were reported killed. A high death rate continued through the next two weeks, with a peak of 49 confirmed killed on August 15, many resulting from police operations in Bulacan and Metro Manila. This was the day before Kian Loyd delos Santos was killed in Caloocan City as part of an operation. Kian was a 17-year-old boy whose death was captured by CCTV cameras as police officers dragged him to an alley where he was shot. These events led to a wave of criticism and protest against the government's campaign. Throughout the rest of August and September 2017, there were markedly fewer deaths per night. On October 12, 2017, a few days beyond the data included in this paper, the antidrug operations were taken out of the purview of the PNP and temporarily placed under the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

In the 456 days since the administration was installed on June 30, 2016, there were only 17 days with no deaths captured in the dataset. These days included Christmas (December 25, 2016), 4 days in February 2017 after *Tokhang* was suspended the first time, and two days

Table 1

Percent of Drug-Related Deaths by Region and by Type of Incident Within Region (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

Region	No. of deaths	% of all deaths	% of killed in police operations in region	% of killed in non-police operations in region	% of region population to national population[a]
NCR - National Capital Region	2000	39.8	49.3[b]	50.7[b]	12.75
I – Ilocos Region	224	4.5	21.9	78.1	4.98
CAR - Cordillera Administrative Region	44	0.9	20.5	79.5	1.71
II - Cagayan Valley	141	2.8	25.5	74.5	3.42
III - Central Luzon	916	18.2	69.9	30.1	11.11
IVA - CALABARZON	517	10.3	64.0	36.0	14.27
IVB - MIMAROPA	11	0.2	72.7	27.3	2.93
V - Bicol Region	121	2.4	72.5[c]	27.5[c]	5.74
VI - Western Visayas	83	1.7	55.3	44.6	7.46
VII - Central Visayas	460	9.2	52	48	7.33
VIII - Eastern Visayas	65	1.3	52.3	47.7	4.4
IX - Zamboanga Peninsula	65	1.3	56.9	43.1	3.59
X - Northern Mindanao	70	1.4	47.1	52.9	4.64
XI - Davao Region	92	1.8	76.1	23.9	4.85
XII - SOCCSKSARGEN	106	2.1	80.2	19.8	4.5
XIII - CARAGA	73	1.5	50.7	49.3	2.57
ARMM - Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	33	0.7	87.9	12.1	3.74
Total	5021	100	54.9	45.1	100

[a]Population estimates are based on 2015 Census of Population

[b]Base for NCR is 1995 cases. Five cases have not been categorized into any type of incident.

[c]Base for Bicol Region is 120 cases. One case has not been categorized into any type of incident.

in August 2017 after the news about the killing of Kian Loyd delos Santos became controversial. Government directives to stop or scale down police operations coincide with the relative intensity of death incidences (even those linked to body dumps and unidentified assailants).

Fig. 2 shows the distribution of deaths by type of incident by month, namely whether these were a result of acknowledged police operations or of killings by unidentified assailants. The deadliest months were the first three after Mr. Duterte was sworn in: July 2016 (738 deaths), August 2016 (669), and September 2016 (690). The least deadly month was February 2017 (88), the month after the official suspension of police operations.

In the period between June and August 2016, there was a rash of killings characterized by bodies found in various parts of cities, usually bound, gagged, or with heads wrapped in packaging tape and often with signboards that said "I'm a drug dealer". Many of these victims remain unidentified. In some cases, the victims were not even known to residents of the communities where they were found in what appeared to be 'body-dump' cases. These incidents started dropping off after September 2016.

A number of deaths resulted from attacks by unidentified assailants. This study shows a trend line that closely tracks the monthly death counts due to police operations. In February 2017, there was a complete drop-off of deaths resulting from police operations while deaths from other killings declined as well, but less sharply. Once *Oplan Double Barrel Reloaded* was reinstated in March, deaths due to police operations began to rise again.

Who were killed?

According to the data, the vast majority of victims were males (94%) and less than a third (30%) were between the ages of 20 and 50 when they were killed. The average age is 37 years old. Almost all victims died of gunshot wounds, regardless of whether they were killed during police operations or by unidentified assailants.

The data indicated an occupation for only a small portion of the total number of victims (16%). In cases in which the victims' occupation was known, the majority were low-paying, low-skilled work. There were 98 tricycle drivers, 32 construction workers or carpenters, 24 vendors, 19 jeepney barkers or dispatchers, 16 farmers, 12 jeepney drivers, 15 habal-habal and pedicab (bicycle) drivers, and 7 garbage

collectors. Thirty-eight were reported as unemployed. Based on their place of residence or their occupation, it is clear that most of the victims were poor.

Some of the victims were government officials, particularly at the level of local government. Many were barangay (village) officials and former barangay officials including 38 barangay chairpersons, 2 former barangay chairpersons, and 46 current or former barangay councilors. Another 28 barangay employees, including *tanod* (watchmen) and treasurers, were also killed. In addition, a total of 107 current and former police officers died during the antidrug campaign. Majority (65) were active-duty officers at the time of death and of these, 11 were killed in line of duty while conducting police operations. The rest were killed as 'targets' in police operations or in killings by unidentified assailants. The list of casualties also includes 11 current and former soldiers and 9 police assets or informants.

Overall national and NCR city distribution of deaths

Killings in the National Capital Region (NCR), which covers 16 contiguous cities and one municipality, comprise 40% of all the victims. This is a disproportionate share, considering only 13% of the country's population resides in the NCR. Table 1 shows the regional differences in total killings and in killings by type of incident. Outside of the NCR, the regions with a high number of deaths are neighboring Region III (Central Luzon) and Region IV-A (CALABARZON), a densely populated set of provinces with large urbanized communities, and Region VII (Central Visayas), which is where one of the largest cities outside of the NCR is located.

Compared to the rest of the country where most of the deaths are attributable to acknowledged police operations, majority of the killings in NCR were due to non-police operations (51%). In contrast, over 60% of deaths in the regions of Central Luzon, CALABARZON, Bicol, Davao, SOCCSKSARGEN, ARMM, and MIMAROPA were due to police operations. In the CAR, Cagayan Valley, and Ilocos regions, less than 30% of deaths were linked to police operations, and the majority of the victims were killed by unidentified assailants.

Fig. 3 shows the number of drug-related deaths in Philippine provinces and in Metro Manila, as captured in the dataset. Outside of the NCR, Bulacan in Central Luzon has the highest number of deaths with 644 cases, of which 73% were due to police operations. This is followed by Cebu in Central Visayas with 383 cases, of which 51% of deaths were

Fig. 3. Drug-Related Killings in the Philippines, May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017.

due to acknowledged police operations.

Within the NCR, the distribution of the 2000 deaths was also significant (see Table 2 and Fig. 4). Drug-related deaths in the NCR were concentrated in Manila City (23%), Quezon City (20%), and Caloocan City (19%). Overall, deaths in these three cities comprise 62% of the total deaths in the NCR and 25%, or one-fourth, of total drug-related deaths in the dataset. Even within these large cities, the spatial spread of the killings indicates concentration in some barangays, while others have remained unaffected.

Analysts have raised important governance issues, given the way

some local governments appear to have been less affected by killings linked to the antidrug campaign compared to others (Mendoza, Yusingco, & Gamboa, 2018). For instance, Muntinlupa, Pateros, Navotas, San Juan, and Valenzuela cities have far smaller numbers of total deaths, compared to both Manila and Quezon City. However, normalizing by population size (number of killings per 100,000 population) shows that Pateros and Navotas both have high rates of killings given their small population. Quezon City, on the other hand, which has a high total death count but large population, is not among the deadliest cities in NCR.

Table 2
Percent of Drug-Related Deaths in NCR Cities by Type of Incident in City (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

City/Municipality	No. of deaths	% of all deaths in NCR	% of killed in police operations in city	% of killed in non-police operations in city	% of city population to NCR population[a]	Deaths per 100,000 people[a]
Manila City	463	23.2	78.2[b]	21.8[b]	13.8	26.0
Quezon City	400	20.0	64.5	35.5	22.8	13.6
Caloocan City	373	18.7	51.2	48.8	12.3	23.5
Pasig City	156	7.8	12.8	87.2	5.9	20.7
Pasay City	118	5.9	19.7[c]	80.3[c]	3.2	28.3
Navotas City	79	4.0	53.2	46.8	1.9	31.7
Marikina City	60	3.0	23.3	76.7	3.5	13.3
Mandaluyong City	57	2.9	17.5	82.5	3.0	14.8
Makati City	52	2.6	9.6	90.4	4.5	8.9
Taguig City	43	2.2	25.6	74.4	5.2	5.3
Parañaque City	43	2.2	16.3	83.7	6.3	6.5
Malabon City	36	1.8	16.7	83.3	2.8	9.8
Las Piñas City	34	1.7	35.3	64.7	4.6	5.8
Muntinlupa City	25	1.3	36.0	64.0	0.5	5.0
Pateros	24	1.2	8.3	91.7	0.9	37.6
San Juan City	20	1.0	10.0	90.0	3.9	16.4
Valenzuela City	17	0.9	70.6	29.4	4.8	2.7
Total	2000	100	49.3	50.7	100	15.5

[a]Population estimates are based on 2015 Census of Population.
[b]Base for Manila is 459 cases. Four cases have not been categorized into any type of incident.
[c]Base for Pasay City is 117 cases. One case has not been categorized into any type of incident.

Similarly, there are marked differences in the proportion of deaths by city in the NCR attributable to police operations and those killings committed by unidentified assailants. Table 2 reveals that while in Manila City more than three-quarters of all deaths (78%) resulted from police operations, in neighboring Makati City it is only 10%. In Quezon City, police operations resulted in 258 deaths, comprising 65% of all drug-related killings in that city; in the neighboring city of Pasig, police killed 20 people, which is 13% of the total death toll of Pasig.

People killed in the context of acknowledged police operations

We take a closer look at deaths resulting from acknowledged police operations, of which there are 2753 recorded in the dataset. Not all circumstances and details of the operations were recorded in the original data sources; however, for those where details are provided, we coded for the type of antidrug operation being conducted, the location of deaths, and allegations of the presence of drugs and guns at the scene.

The majority of police operation deaths recorded in this dataset were in the context of buy-bust operations (see Table 3), where members of the police force pose as dealers or buyers and capture those who attempt to buy or deal (58%). A much smaller share of deaths (15%) was in the context of serving a warrant. These are cases similar to the police operation against Ozamiz City Mayor Reynaldo Parojinog who, with 14 other people in his home, was killed by the police who were serving a warrant just after 2 am on July 30, 2017 (Kaiman, 2017). Very small percentages of the deaths were linked to other forms of operations such as raids (6%), checkpoints (4%), and police sweeps in communities (3%).

In around 90% of the deaths linked to acknowledged police operations, a reason was given for the killing of a suspect, typically by police officials interviewed by media at the scene (see Table 4). In some cases, police offered multiple reasons for a death in the context of an operation. Each instance in which a reason was given for the killing was coded in our dataset. Seven times out of 10 (74%), police said there was a shootout or gunfight that led to the killing of a suspect. Two times out of 10 (19%), police claimed they acted in self-defense because the person was a threat to their lives (e.g., pulled out a gun, grabbed a gun from officers). In media coverage of the antidrug campaign, these explanations became known as *nanlaban* ("resisted" or "fought back"), a general label the police use to mean any of these reasons.

When a killing occurs as a result of acknowledged police operations, the police often reported the alleged presence of a gun or guns at the scene (76%) and the presence of drugs (64%), as shown in Table 5. In some cases, they also reported the presence of drug paraphernalia (15%). In cases of killings by unidentified assailants the numbers are much fewer—only 20% of the crime scenes have guns, only 11% have physical evidence of unused drugs, and only 3.5% have drug paraphernalia.

People killed in non-police operations

Persons killed in non-police operations make up 2262 cases (45%) in the dataset. These include victims who were killed (usually shot) by assailants, mostly on a motorcycle, and discovered where they were shot (38%). It also includes victims whose bodies were 'dumped' in an area and may or may not have been killed in another location (7%). The scale of these type of killings started in the first two months of the administration, when dead bodies appeared on public streets, bound and gagged, with a signboard on top of them alleging that they were drug dealers or users.

These incidents, including rising patterns of assassinations of drug suspects by unknown assailants, fueled a narrative that the antidrug campaign involved not just official police operations but also some form of vigilante action. Victims of the murders were all accused in the news reports by various local officials and village drug watchlists to have been into drugs in some way.

Of the cases where killings were committed by unidentified assailants, 46% involved assailants who used a motorcycle for the attack. In 28% of the incidents, the assailants were on foot, and in 5%, assailants were in a van or a car. Almost all of the victims (99%) were shot dead. In 14% of the cases, the killing involved one assailant, while in 27%, the attack was carried out by two people. In 17%, 3 or more assailants were involved. It is unclear in many of the cases (42%) how many assailants were involved. Of the 355 cases categorized as 'body dumps', 45% had gunshot wounds, 37% had their heads wrapped or their mouth gagged, and 35% had their hands or feet bound when they were found. Some victims had knife or stab wounds (12%) while others were stuffed in a box or sack or wrapped in a cloth (11%).

Most of the killings happened on a street or in an alley (27%), as shown in Table 6. Many of the victims were killed in, or in front of, their houses (24%). If the killing was committed by unidentified assailants,

Fig. 4. Drug-Related Killings in Metro Manila (NCR) cities (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

44% of such cases occurred on a street or alley, and 29% in or near a house. In police operations, most of the killings happened in or near a house (23%). Many took place on a street or alley (13%) and in areas identified as 'drug dens' (5%). Majority of the 'body dumps' were found on the street or alley (52%) and a small number were found in vacant lots (12%). Among the victims who were killed in or near houses, when

Table 3
Percent of Killed in Acknowledged Police Operations, by Type of Police Operation (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

Type of police operation	% of killed in police operations
Buy-bust operation	58.3
Serving of warrant	14.7
Police raid	6.0
Checkpoint	3.6
Police sweep or search	3.2
Others	4.3
No specific type of police operation mentioned	3.9
Total killed in police operations	2753

Note: Multiple response.

Table 4
Percent of Killed in Acknowledged Police Operations, by Reason Cited for Killing (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

Reason cited for killing	% of killed in police operations
Person engaged in a shootout	73.7
Police acted on self-defense	19.4
Person resisted arrest or search	14.8
Person attempted to run or flee	9.1
No reason mentioned	9.7
Total killed in police operations	2753

Note: Multiple response.

these were done by unidentified assailants, 79% resided in the house; in police operations, 63% of the victims resided in the house. Some of the victims killed in houses were visitors of the house-owner.

Discussion and conclusions

This paper introduces an initiative to build an individual-victim level database of drug-related deaths that occurred in the course of 508 days since Mr. Duterte was elected, including the first 456 days of the Duterte administration. Creating a credible and reliable system to track and collect data on the killings is of critical importance based on broad goals of accountability and truth-telling. The Duterte government has been inconsistent in providing official statistics and information related to deaths in connection with the anti-illegal drugs campaign. That makes an independent empirical monitoring even more relevant.

Our analysis of the temporal pattern of drug-related deaths reveals the scale of killings in the country, with rapid escalation starting in July 2016 and lasting throughout the rest of that year. Noticeable abatement can be seen after key historical points in the antidrug campaign, with slowdowns in the rate of nightly deaths during periods when *Oplan Tokhang* was suspended and operations were moved to the PDEA from the PNP, as the PDEA is a much smaller enforcement unit. Noticeable decline in deaths were also observed after PNP was criticized for the killing of 17-year-old Kian Loyd delos Santos.

Spatial distribution of the deaths was also examined relative to subnational political units, regions for the entire country, and by city for the major hotspot of the NCR. Analyses indicate a large concentration of deaths in the NCR compared to the rest of the country, although caution

Table 6
Common Locations of Killings, by Type of Incident (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

Location of incident*	% of total killed	% of killed in police operations	% of killed by assailants	% of bodies found
Street or alley	27.4	13.0	43.7	51.5
In or near house	24.1	23.3	29.4	1.7
(% of killed in or near house who are staying or living in house)	(70.4)	(63)	(79.1)	–
Vehicle	8.6	3.9	16.5	2.5
Establishment	5.0	1.2	10.9	3.1
'Drug den'	3.7	5.3	2.1	–
Public space	2.9	2.9	2.7	3.4
Vacant lot	1.2	0.6	0.3	11.5
Bridge	0.8	0.8	0.3	3.7
Holding facility	0.7	1.1	0.2	–
Body of water	0.7	0.4	0.2	5.9
Total number of deaths	5021	2753	1907	355

Notes: *Multiple response. Total number of deaths in the dataset is 5021 but six cases have not been categorized to any type of incident so total number of killings in three types of incident in the table is 5015.

should be exercised in interpreting this. Given the reliance on media-based source material, there may be a larger proportion of unreported deaths in areas outside of the NCR. Further to spatial differences, the distribution of type of incident–whether deaths resulted from police operations or perpetrated by unidentified assailants–also varies widely across cities and regions. Analysts are already turning to an analysis of these patterns to try and establish whether and to what extent some of the deaths are linked to the failure of local government units to respond pragmatically to protect their citizens.

We identified worrisome trends in the way many of the killings were committed. Most notable is that a large percentage of them occurred in homes, regardless of whether the incident was a police operation or attributed to an unidentified assailant. This is even more significant in official police operations. The killing of suspects in private homes during official police actions raises important issues of accountability and the effectiveness of official police policy in conducting such operations. There are questions of whether these operations were conducted in contravention of rules of procedure whereby these officials are prohibited from entering houses without a warrant.

Further, the spatial differences in distribution of incident type, whether police operations or not, are stark, both at the provincial level and at the city level within the NCR. Without more in-depth, detailed information, it is difficult to make conclusions about why these differences occur. It is an open question whether the differences by political boundaries, along which local government policies or economic conditions likewise vary, may provide key explanations for the variations in types of incidents.

This study relies mainly on media sources, a limitation of this project. We speculate that the current version of the dataset provides a very conservative listing of victims. That is, all of the deaths in the data here can be traced to identifiable and verifiable incidences in media reports, in many cases with photographs or video to support the existence of a

Table 5
Alleged Presence of Guns, Drugs, and Drug Paraphernalia, by Type of Incident (May 10, 2016 to September 29, 2017).

Presence of guns, drugs and drug paraphernalia	% of total killed	% of killed in police operations	% of killed by assailants
Presence of gun/s	50.0	76.1	20.2
Presence of drugs	40.5	63.9	10.5
Presence of drug paraphernalia	9.6	14.7	3.5
Total number of deaths	5021	2753	1907

Note: Total number of deaths in the dataset is 5021 but six cases have not been categorized to any type of incident.

victim. Given the apparent magnitude of the antidrug campaign launched by the Duterte administration in 2016, it is highly likely that many more killings were not reported by media and legal groups.

As a national policy very strongly labeled a 'war on drugs,' following the international push to prevent drug use (Werb, 2018), the Philippines' aggressive punitive and prohibitionist antidrug campaign has garnered global attention. This attention has been less on the issue of drugs and more on the manner in which the policy has been implemented, marred by what observers have called massive scale extrajudicial killings and resulting violence in the form of homicides and alleged targeted killings between drug gangs or committed by 'vigilantes'.

Results of this study point to critical policy responses in the short and long term to secure sustainable measures addressing drug dependency and addiction, which do not compromise the overall environment of rule of law and protection of human rights. The stark differences in rates of killings across local government jurisdictions point to some potential immediate policy measures to curb the violence associated with the operational police campaign. Providing accountability mechanisms for drug-related enforcement actions that allow for visibility and oversight across local jurisdictions is one clear policy response. Further, temporal patterns of pushing for simultaneous police operations nationally and moving responsibility from the police to the PDEA coinciding with the rises and falls of daily counts of violent encounters indicates a need to either introduce stricter operational policies and accountability measures for drug-enforcement actions by the police, or reduce the role of the institution in targeting lower-level drug offenders until safeguards are in place. Introducing monitoring measures to ensure strict compliance with police antidrug operational rules, as has been proposed by some legislators (e.g., body cameras), would help curb the fatal violence associated with the antidrug campaign.

Over the longer run, regular monitoring and tracking of not only antidrug enforcement action but also progress in providing health-based approaches to drug dependency are necessary to enable evidence-based policy adjustments. Health-based approaches are currently in written policies but are poorly supported or are not where current efforts are focused. These include interventions such as community-based rehabilitation programs. Advocates of health-based approaches, in order to make headway in increasing their role in long-term strategies for drug policies, need to conduct empirical studies of impacts of enforcement-led actions in relation to costs and compare these against health-based interventions. The rising costs to human life and erosion of rules of law signal that these monitoring tools are urgently needed.

Acknowledgments

References

ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group (2016). *Maps, charts: The death toll of the war on drugs* (July 13) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromABS-CBN Newshttp://news.abs-cbn.com/specials/map-charts-the-death-toll-of-the-war-on-drugs.

Agren, D. (2010). *Mexico: Death toll from drug-related violence is thousands higher than was reported earlier*(August 3) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 from. New York Timeshttps://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/world/americas/04forbriefs-MEXICO.html.

Baldwin, C., & Marshall, A. (2016). *As death toll rises, Duterte deploys dubious data in 'war on drugs'*(October 18) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 from. Reutershttps://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-duterte-data/.

Baldwin, C., Marshall, A., & Sagolj, D. (2016). *Police rack up almost perfect deadly record in Philippines drug war*(December 5) Retrieved 2nd of July 2019 from. Reutershttps://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-duterte-police/.

Barrera, D. J. (2017). Drug war stories and the Philippine president. *Asian Criminology, 12*, 341–359.

Buan, L. (2018). *SC compels government to provide full Tokhang documentation* (April 3) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/nation/199457-supreme-court-compels-government-tokhang-documentation.

Buan, L. (2019a). *Calida blocks release of drug war docs, Supreme Court must rule* (February 21) Retrieved on 22nd of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/nation/224036-calida-blocks-release-drug-war-documents-supreme-court-must-rule.

Buan, L. (2019b). *Supreme Court rules to release drug war documents* (April 2) Retrieved on 2nd of July 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/nation/227214-supreme-court-decision-release-drug-war-documents.

Buan, L., Talabong, R., & Gavilan, J. (2019). *Duterte gov't allows 'drug war' deaths to go unsolved* (January 14) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/220595-duterte-government-drug-war-deaths-unsolved.

Bueza, M. (2017). *In numbers: The Philippines' 'war on drugs'* (April 23/September 13) Retrieved 24th of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines-war-drugs.

Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (2017). Dealing more effectively and humanely with illegal drugs. *Crime and Justice, 46*, 950158. https://doi.org/10.1086/688458.

Coomber, R., Moyle, L., & Mahoney, M. K. (2019). Symbolic policing: Situating target police operations/ 'crackdowns' on street-level drug markets. *Policing and Society, 29*(1), 1–17.

Coronel, S. (2017). Murder as enterprise: Police profiteering in Duterte's war on drugs. In N. Curato (Ed.). *A Duterte reader: Critical essays on Rodrigo Duterte's early presidency* (pp. 167–198). Quezon City: Bughaw: Ateneo University Press.

Csete, J., Kamarulzaman, A., Kazatchkine, M., Altice, F., Balicki, M., Buxton, J., ... Beyrer, C. (2016). Public health and international drug policy: Report of the Johns Hopkins–Lancet commission on drug policy and health. *Lancet, 387*(10026), 1427–1480. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00619-X.

Cupin, B. (2016). *Duterte to PNP: 'Do your duty and I will die for you'* (July 1) Retrieved 25th of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/nation/138296-duterte-pnp-duty-die-for-you.

Dangerous Drugs Board (2016). *2015 Nationwide survey on the nature and extent of drug abuse in the Philippines.* Manila: Dangerous Drugs Board.

Drucker, E. (2002). Population impact of mass incarceration under New York's Rockefeller drug laws: An analysis of years of life lost. *Journal of Urban Health, 79*(3), 434–435.

Elovich, R., & Drucker, E. (2008). On drug treatment and social control: Russian narcology's great leap backwards. *Harm Reduction Journal, 5*(1), 23. https://doi.org/10.1186/1477-7517-5-23.

Esguerra, D. J. (2019a). *Palace: Duterte's 7-8 million drug users estimate refers to national figure* (March 1) Retrieved on 24th of March 2019 fromPhilippine Daily Inquirerhttps://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1091085/palace-dutertes-7-8-million-drug-users-estimate-refers-to-national-figure.

Esguerra, D. J. (2019b). *Gov't: 72 killed in January 2019 drug ops; total hits 5,176* (February 28) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 fromPhilippine Daily Inquirerhttps://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1090666/govt-72-killed-in-january-2019-drug-ops-total-hits-5176#ixzz5ipMAFarA.

Fatal Encounters (2019). *Methodology* (n.d.) Retrieved 23rd of March 2019 fromhttps://www.fatalencounters.org/methodology/.

Felipe, C. S. (2018). *PNP: 22,983 deaths under inquiry since drug war launched* (June 11) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromThe Philippine Starhttps://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/06/11/1823545/pnp-22983-deaths-under-inquiry-drug-war-launched.

Gavilan, J. (2017). *What do gov't circulars' operationalizing' Duterte's war on drugs say?* (November 21) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/fast-facts/189132-philippine-government-circulars-duterte-drug-war.

Gita, R. A. (2017). *Duterte: Philippines is a narco-state* (August 17) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 fromSunStarhttps://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/159065.

Gonzales, J., & Cabigao, F., Jr. (2017). *'Oplan tokhang': From tagging to killing (part 4 of 'War on drugs: The unheard voices series')* (October 27) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromABS-CBN Newshttp://news.abs-cbn.com/war-on-drugs/part4.

Habaradas, M. A., Santiago, R. P., Reyes, J. A., & Agunoy, M. C. (2019). *How change rendered human rights vulnerable: Examining the anti-drug campaign legal framework with a human rights lens. ASOG working paper 19-006* (April) Retrieved 7th of July 2019 fromhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378016.

Hawdon, J. E. (2001). The role of presidential rhetoric in the creation of a moral panic: Reagan, Bush, and the war on drugs. *Deviant Behavior, 22*, 419–445.

Hughes, C. E., Barratt, M. J., Ferris, J. A., Mier, L. J., & Winstock, A. R. (2018). Drug-related police encounters across the globe: How do they compare? *International Journal of Drug Policy, 56*, 197–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.03.005.

Human Rights Watch (2017). *"License to kill": Philippine police killings in Duterte's "war on drugs"*(March) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 from. Human Rights Watchhttps://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/02/license-kill/philippine-police-killings-dutertes-war-drugs.

Innes, M. (2014). *Signal crimes, social reactions to crime, disorder and control.* Oxford: OUP.

Inquirer.net (2016). *The kill list* (July 7) Retrieved fromPhilippine Daily Inquirerhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/794598/kill-list-drugs-duterte.

Interaksyon (2017). *Ex-PDEA chief Santiago, whose '4-M addicts' data Duterte has sworn by, replaces DDB chair fired for citing '1.8-M'* (July 9) Retrieved on 17th of July 2019 fromInteraksyonhttp://www.interaksyon.com/breaking-news/2017/07/09/83912/ex-pdea-chief-santiago-whose-4-m-addicts-data-duterte-has-sworn-by-replaces-ddb-chair%E2%80%A9-fired-for-citing-1-8-m/.

International Criminal Court (2018). *Statement of the prosecutor of the International*

Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on opening preliminary examinations into the si-tuations in the Philippines and Venezuela (February 8) Retrieved 25th of March 2019 fromhttps://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208-otp-stat.

Izadi, E. (2016). *'Shoot him and I'll give you a medal': New Philippine president urges public to kill drug lords* (June 6) Retrieved on 24th of June 2018 fromThe Washington Posthttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/06/shoot-him-and-ill-give-you-a-medal-new-philippine-president-urges-public-to-kill-drug-lords/?utm_term=.7eb2660fb6d8.

Jensen, S., & Hapal, K. (2018). Police violence and corruption in the Philippines: Violent exchange and the war on drugs. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2*(2018), 39–62.

Kaiman, J. (2017). *Philippine police killed a mayor and much of his family. Was it a raid gone wrong, or a massacre?* (August 7) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromLos Angeles Timeshttp://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-philippines-mayoral-raid-20170804-story.html.

Kreuzer, P. (2018). Excessive use of deadly force by police in the Philippines before Duterte. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48*(4), 671–684.

Kreuzer, P. (2009). Private political violence and boss-rule in the Philippines. *Behemoth, 1*, 47–63.

Lasco, G. (2014). *Pampagilas*: Methamphetamine in the everyday economic lives of un-derclass male youths in a Philippine port. *International Journal of Drug Policy, 25*, 783–788. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.06.011.

Lasco, G. (2018). *Kalaban*: Young drug users' engagements with law enforcement in the Philippines. *International Journal of Drug Policy, 52*, 39–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.11.006.

Lema, K. (2017). *Philippines' Duterte says police can kill' idiots' who resist arrest* (August 28) Retrieved on 25th of March 2019 fromReutershttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-idUSKCN1B80D5.

Martin, I., Palepu, A., Wood, E., Li, K., Montaner, J., & Kerr, T. (2009). Violence among street-involved youth: The role of methamphetamine. *European Addiction Research, 15*(1), 32–38. https://doi.org/10.1159/000173007.

McCoy, A. W. (2002). *Policing America's empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the surveillance state.* Madison: The University of Wisoncs.

Mendoza, R., Yusingco, M. H., & Gamboa, J. (2018). *The role of mayors and barangay captains in the Philippines' anti-drugs campaign. ASOG working paper 18-002.* Quezon City: Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University.

McDonald, D., & Hughes, C. (2017). Drug laws and regulations. In A. Ritter, T. King, & N. Lee (Eds.). *Drug use in Australian society* (pp. 223–246). (2nd ed) South Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Narag, R. (2018). *State of the PH in 2018: Our jails are now world's most congested* (July 3) Retrieved on 22nd of March 2019 fromPhilippine Center for Investigative Journalismhttps://pcij.org/stories/ph-jails-detention-centers-now-worlds-most-congested/.

Nicolas, F. (2017). *War on drugs suspended, takes back seat in war against rogue cops* (January 30) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromCNN Philippineshttp://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/01/30/war-on-drugs-on-hold-suspended-pnp-war-on-scalawags.html.

Palatino, M. (2017). *Duterte's 'war on drugs' in the Philippines: By the numbers* (January 9) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromThe Diplomathttps://thediplomat.com/2017/01/dutertes-war-on-drugs-in-the-philippines-by-the-numbers/.

Parrocha, A. (2019). *UNHRC resolution, abuse of processes: Medialdea* (July 15) Retrieved on 17th of July 2019 fromPhilippine News Agencyhttps://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1075012.

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (2017). *PCIJ findings: What's flawed, fuzzy with drug war numbers?* (June 8) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromPhilippine Center for Investigative Journalismhttp://pcij.org/stories/pcij-findings-whats-flawed-fuzzy-with-drug-war-numbers/.

Pulse Asia Research, Inc (2016). *Media release on pulse Asia research's December 2015 nationwide survey on urgent personal and national concerns of Filipinos* (January 11) Retrieved 25th of March 2019 fromhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3b9qPFV1cRDVGNpZHZoWUVmcTA/view.

The Guardian (2016). *Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte urges people to kill drug addicts* (July 1) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromThe Guardianhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-urges-people-to-kill-drug-addicts.

Ramos, M. (2016). *'Shabu addicts beyond redemption'* (July 21) Retrieved 22nd of March 2019 fromPhilippine Daily Inquirerhttps://newsinfo.inquirer.net/797735/shabu-addicts-beyond-redemption.

Ranada, P. (2017). *Is Duterte's '4 million drug addicts' a 'real number'?* (May 6) Retrieved 24th of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/rappler-blogs/169009-duterte-drug-addicts-real-number.

Rantatalo, O. (2016). Media representations and police officers' identity work in a spe-cialized polie tactical unit. *Policing and Society, 26*(1), 97–113.

Soriano, C., David, C., & Atun, J. M. (2019). Crystallising the official narrative: News discourses about the killings from the Philippine government's campaign against il-legal drugs. *Journalism.* https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884919867820 Epub ahead of print.

Sridharan, V. (2018). *How many people have been killed in the Philippines' bloody drug war so far?* (February 24) Retrieved 24th of June 2018 fromInternational Business Timeshttps://www.ibtimes.co.uk/how-many-people-have-been-killed-philippines-bloody-drug-war-so-far-1663139.

Sunstar (2017). *'Oplan Tokhang' suspension takes effect nationwide* (January 31) Retrieved on 17th of July 2019 fromSunstarhttps://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/123445.

Talabong, R. (2018). *At least 33 killed daily in the Philippines since Duterte assumed office* (May 12) Retrieved 24th of March 2019 fromRapplerhttps://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/204949-pnp-number-deaths-daily-duterte-administration.

Tate, J., Jenkins, J., Rich, S., Muyskens, J., Elliott, K., Melinik, T., et al. (2016). *How the Washington Post is examining police shootings in the United States* (July 7) Retrieved on 23rd of March 2019 fromThe Washington Posthttps://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-the-washington-post-is-examining-police-shootings-in-the-united-states/2016/07/07/d9c52238-43ad-11e6-8856-f26de2537a9d_story.html?utm_term=.82ed31c8e329.

Warburg, A. B., & Jensen, S. (2018). *Policing the war on drugs and the transformation of urban space in Manila.* Environment and Planning D: Society and Spacehttps://doi.org/10.1177/0263775818817299 Epub ahead of print.

Werb, D. (2018). Post-war prevention: Emerging frameworks to prevent drug use after the war on drugs. *International Journal of Drug Policy, 51*, 160–164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2017.06.012.

Werb, D., Rowell, G., Guyatt, G., Kerr, T., Montaner, J., & Wood, E. (2011). Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review. *International Journal of Drug Policy, 22*, 87–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2011.02.002.

Williams, S., & Palmer, E. (2016). Global focus: Will president Duterte face court for his bloody war on drugs? *LSJ: Law Society of NSW Journal, 28*, 22–23.